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NOTES
The Value of A Child
I. THE HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH
The early English common law afforded no remedy in
civil courts for damages sustained by the wrongful death of a
human being.' However, a method of redress was available
under the common law which was called the "appeal."'2 Such
an "appeal" consisted of an accusation against one who had
committed a heinous crime, and a demand for punishment for
the injury suffered, rather than for the offense against the
public.3 This form of redress was the offspring of the ancient
doctrine of "wergild" under which pecuniary satisfaction was
tendered to the injured party of his relations as expiation for
enormous offenses.4 It has been argued that the later enact-
ments of Wrongful Death Statutes are actually the reappear-
ance of the old remedy of "wergild," despite the fact that
courts have stated that such statutes create a new right not
recognized at common law.5 In the following examination of
the current treatment of damages for wrongful death, it is
valuable to remember this ancient history and to consider
whether courts are indeed perpetuating "wergild" to some ex-
tent.
Lord Campbell's Actu
In 1846, Lord Campbell's Act was enacted in Britain. The
act recognized the wrongful killing of a human being as a tort,
and allowed the decedent's beneficiaries to recover such dam-
1." 'At common law there was no right of action for death caused by wrong-
ful act.' Deinds v. A.C.L.RR. Co., 70 S.C. 254, 49 S. E. 869, 870 .... There are
numerous other South Carolina cases sustaining the foregoing statement. In-
deed, it is now elementary in this as well as other jurisdictions. 'Although the
rule has been criticized as being technical and without the support of sound
principle, it is too firmly established to be longer open to question.' 17 C.J.
1181." Tollerso v. Atlantic C.L.RR. Co., 188 S. C. 67, 69, 198 S.E. 164, 165
(1936).
2. Annot., 74 A.L.R., 11, 13 (1931) citing Underwood v. Gulf Ref. Co., 128
La. 968, 55 So. 641 (1911).
3. Id.
4. Id at 14.
5. Id. citing McKay v. New Eng. Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454, 43 A. 29
(1899).
6. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
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ages as the jury determined had resulted.7 The present-day
wrongful death statutes embody Lord Campbell's Act provi-
sions insofar as the right to maintain such an action is con-
cerned. 8 The recognized interpretation of Lord Campbell's
Act and its offspring is that such statutes create a new cause
of action "beyond that which the deceased would have had, had
he survived."9 From this matrix, varying interpretations of
the measure for damages evolved. The history of legal actions
subsequent to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act suffi-
ciently explains why the question of damages has been and still
is a perplexing one.
In one of the first cases decided under Lord Campbell's
Act, Armsworth v. South Eastern Railroad Co., "0 the British
court stated that one reason such actions had been prohibited
previously was due to the concensus of opinion that it would
be impossible to determine the value of a human life. The
court then stated that the question of the amount of damages
would long be a source of consternation to both juries and
judges until some definite principles were established. The
court instructed the jury to grant what it considered to be a
fair compensation.
It was in the cases that followed, particularly Blake v.
Midland Railroad Co.,'1 that the recovery under Lord Camp-
bell's Act became confined to compensation for the amount of
pecuniary loss suffered by the beneficiaries. This type of loss
was interpreted to include the amount of benefit which such
beneficiaries could reasonably have expected to receive from
the deceased. This interpretation permitted the awarding of
a substantial recovery for the death of a child.' 2
In general, there are three major approaches to the re-
covery of damages under wrongful death statutes in the
United States. The first of these, adhered to by few states, is
7. 22 Am. JuR. 2d Death §2 (1965).
8. Id.
9. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11, 14 (1931).
10. 11 JUR. (Eng.) 758 (1847), discussed in Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11, 14-15
(1931).
11. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Reprint 35 (1852), discussed in Annot., 74 A.L.R.
11, 15 (1931).
12. Bramall v. Lees, 29 L.T. (Eng.) 111 (1857); Dalton v. South Eastern
R. Co., 4 C.B.N.S. 296, 140 Eng. Reprint 1098 (1858), discussed in Annot., 74
A.L.R. 11, 15 (1931).
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the punitive approach to damages.' 3 Under such a statute,
damages are awarded in proportion to the degree of culpabil-
ity inherent in the wrongful act of the defendant.
14
The second, and majority approach is the pecuniary loss
theory."; Under this theory, recovery by the beneficiaries is
limited to the probable amount of pecuniary loss suffered as a
result of the death of their relative. In determining this
amount, it is generally held that the following elements may be
evaluated:
[B]roadly speaking, in determining the amount of damages recoverable
for wrongful death, it is proper to take into consideration such factors,
varying in individual cases, as the victim's life expectancy, character,
health, habits, talents, prospects, prior earnings, probable future earn-
ings, needs of and contributions to dependents, and current returns on
investments.' 0
The third approach, to which South Carolina adheres,
provides for recovery of pecuniary loss but also permits the re-
covery of damages for loss of companionship, mental suffer-
ing, and other intangible injuries.'
7
This brief examination of the history of wrongful death
statutes and the current varieties of such statutes is a neces-
sary foundation for the examination of recoveries for the
wrongful death of minor children, since few states have spe-
cial statutes dealing exclusively with this area.'8 It is also
valuable as illustrative of the inherent speculative nature of
damages in all wrongful death actions before focusing on the
minor child area in which such speculation is necessarily even
13. 22 Ami. Jur. 2d Death §2 (1965).
14. Id.
15. 22 A-m. JuR. 2d Death §118 (1965) ; 25A C.J.S. Death §95 (1966).
16. 22 Aler. JuR. 2d Death §140 (1965).
17. Id at §§104, 107, 126, 127. See Brooks v. U.S., 273 F. Supp. 619
(D.S.C. 1964).
18. For examples of special statutes for the wrongful death of a minor child,
see FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.03 (1964) which provides that the father of the child,
or if he is dead, the mother may recover "not only for the loss of services of
such minor child, but in addition thereto, such sum for the mental pain and
suffering of the parent (or both parents) if they survive, as the jury may
assess." Indiana, likewise has a separate statutory provision for the maintenance
of an action for the wrongful death of a child. BuRNs IND. STAT. ANN. §2-217
(Supp. 1962). But, being a pecuniary loss jurisdiction, damages are limited to
the value of the child's services until he would have reached his majority, less
the costs of support and maintenance during that period. See, Jones v. Dreury's
Ltd., 149 F. 2d 250 (7th Cir. 1945).
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more prevalent. Of the three approaches to damages discussed,
the pecuniary loss and the pecuniary loss plus intangible in-
juries approaches are by far the most widely used and shall
be the subjects of discussion.
I. THE PECUNIARY Loss APPROACH TO DAMAGES
In a jurisdiction utilizing the pecuniary loss approach to
damages, either because of specific statutory language or be-
cause of judicial interpretation, the often enunciated measure
for such damages is the value of the child's services to his par-
ents or other persons entitled to such services until he reaches
his majority, less the probable expense that would be incurred
in rearing and educating the child.10 The majority of States
also permit recovery for the value of benefits which, from the
evidence, the parents or other beneficiaries could reasonably
have expected to receive from the child after he attained his
majority.
20
A Pennsylvania district court held that the following ele-
ments were properly considered in determining the measure of
pecuniary loss: the child's age, health, mental condition and
probable earning capability as reflected by the occupation and
economic status of the parents. 21 Another federal court in an
action for wrongful death under Nebraska law, allowed the
jury to consider the condition of the parties involved, includ-
ing health, physical condition, income and life expectancy of
the parents and all of the other related circumstances revealed
by the evidence.22 Another case held that the following aspects
of a child's life were proper elements of consideration:
In the case of the death of a minor, its age and sex have been said to
be a proper consideration. And in the case of the wrongful death of a
child old enough to have established a character, elements that the
courts have recognized as proper for consideration in assessing the
beneficiary's loss include the decedent's habits of industry, sobriety,
kindliness, tractability, and obedience. 23
It is generally the rule in pecuniary loss jurisdictions that
when a minor is killed, a presumption of pecuniary loss
19. Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 485 (1950), listing the following States as adher-
ents to this approach: Ark., Cal., Colo., Hawaii, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Maine, Md.,
Mich., Miss., Missouri, Mont., Neb., N.J., N.D., Penn., Texas., and Wash.
20. Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 485, 506 (1950).
21. Palmer v. Moren, 44 F. Supp. 704 (D. Pa. 1942).
22. Wright v. Hoover, 329 F. 2d 72 (8th Cir. 1964).
23. 22 Am. JuR. 2d Death §147 (1965).
19721
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arises. 24 In at least one jurisdiction, Illinois, this presumption
alone is sufficient to warrant a substantial recovery.
25
The obvious failing of the pecuniary loss of "balance
sheet" method of damages, in its strict form, is the fact that
the cost of rearing and educating a child greatly exceeds the
value which could be assigned to the services such a child could
render. While this has not prevented the awarding of damages
to parents of the deceased, it has obviously been conducive to
relatively small awards. If nothing else, it has surely mis-
directed the attention of the jury to a relatively insignificant
aspect of the parent-child relationship. This approach ignores
the major injury suffered, which is obviously emotional, even
thought it would be quixotic to believe that regardless of such
instructions, a jury would not consider the sentimental and
emotional aspects of such a case. Understandably, the pecuni-
ar-y loss approach has received criticism.
Wycko v. Gnodtke2 6
In 1960 the Michigan Supreme Court's growing dissatis-
faction with the pecuniary loss approach to damages for the
wrongful death of a child reached maturity in Wycko v.
Gnodtke. In this decision the court presented an incisive anal-
ysis of the historical milieu in which Lord Campbell's Act was
enacted and interpreted:
The rulings reflect the philosophy of the times, its ideals, and its social
conditions.... It was an era when ample work could be found for the
agile bodies and nimble fingers of small children. . . In 1816, the ap-
prenticeship of parish children under the age of nine was forbidden, but
the underground employment of children under ten was not forbidden
until 1843, just five years before the passage of the progenitor of our
statute.
This, then, was the day from which our precedents come, a day when
employment of children of tender years was the accepted practice and
ther (sic) pecuniary contributions to the family both substantial and
provable. It is not surprising that the courts of such a society should
have read into the statutory words "such damages as they [the jury]
may think proportional to the injury resulting from such death" not
only the requirement of a pecuniary loss, but, moreover, a pecuniary
loss established by a wage benefit-less-cost measure of damages ...
Loss meant only money loss, and money loss from the death of a child
24. 25A C.J.S. Death §118 (1966); 22 Am. JuR. 2d Death §250 (1965).
25. Pavalon, Damages-Wrongful Death of Children, 50 Cur. B. REc. 84
(1968). The writer states that Illinois does not, however, tell the jury to de-
duct the cost of rearing and educating the child.
26. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W. 2d 118 (1960).
[Vol. 24
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meant only his lost wages. All else was imaginary. The only reality
was the King's shilling.
2 7
Condemning this method of evaluating damages as obviously
out of step with modern sociological conditions, the Michigan
Court rejected the child-labor measure of pecuniary loss. In
its place, the court substituted what has been labeled the "lost
investment" 28 test for pecuniary loss:
The use of material analogies may be helpful and inoffensive. Just as
with respect to a manufacturing plant, or industrial machine, value in-
volves the costs of acquisition, emplacement, upkeep, maintenance, ser-
vice, repair and renovation, so, in our context, we must consider the
expenses of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of
nurture and shelter. Moreover, just as an item of machinery forming
part of a functioning industrial plant has a value over and above that
of a similar item in a showroom, awaiting purchase, so an individual
member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning so-
cial and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and
protection, in a word, companionship. The human companionship thus
afforded has a definite, substantial, and ascertainable pecuniary value
and its loss forms a part of the "value" of the life we seek to ascer-
tain. We are, it will be noted, restricting the losses to pecuniary losses,
the actual money value of the life of the child, not the sorrow and
anguish caused by its death. 29
While forbidding recovery for sorrow and anguish, the court
recognized that such injuries were capable of pecuniary eval-
uation, but could not be recovered in Michigan until the legis-
lature permitted the recovery of these elements of damage.30
The Wycko decision has become the model for reforma-
tion in pecuniary loss jurisdictions. 31 In recognizing that a
child is a "blessed" expense and permitting recovery for this
expense, the court has placed the jury evaluation of damages
on a more tangible basis than the child-labor standard. Futher-
more, in permitting recovery for loss of companionship, which
27. Id at 335-37, 105 N.W. 2d at 120-21.
28. Note, Damage Recoverable for Wrongful Death of Minor Children, 39
N.D.L. REv. 198 (1963).
29. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 339-40, 105 N.W. 2d 118, 122-23
(1960).
30. Id. at 340, 105 N.W. 2d at 123.
31. See Forrado v. Jill Bros., 249 N.Y.S. 2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1964) in which a
New York court advocated revision of that State's wrongful death act to con-
form to Wycko. See also Note, Danages Recoverable for Wrongful Death of
Minor Children, 39 N.D.L. RE-v. 198 (1963); Pavalon, Damages-WT~rongful
Death of Children, 50 Cm. B. REc. 84 (1968).
1972]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [], Art. 15
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss1/15
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the court states can be valued on the "open market, ' 32 the jury
is able to consider the emotional aspects of the injury, at least
indirectly. The element of companionship is primarily an in-
tangible one and, to a great degree, speculative, but the "lost
investment" elements are much more definite and economically
ascertainable measures of damages than the old wage benefit-
less-rearing cost test, and obviously, is more conducive to the
awarding of higher verdicts than the old test.
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPROACH TO DAMAGES
The South Carolina statutes dealing with wrongful death
provide the following guidelines to measure damages in such
cases:
In every such action the jury may give such damages, including exem-
plary damages when such wrongful act, neglect or default was the re-
sult of recklessness, wilfulness or malice, as they may think pro-
portioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties re-
spectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be
brought.
33
This provision has been interpreted as not restricting recovery
strictly to pecuniary losses:
[I]t will be noticed that our statute, unlike many others of a similar
character, does not speak of pecuniary loss or injury which might possi-
bly tend to show the injury for which damages are allowed, was con-
fined to the deprivation of some legal claim susceptible of measurement
by a pecuniary standard, but its language is broader ... and . . . it is
quite certain that the beneficiaries of the action may sustain injury by
the death of a relative over and above the loss of any legal claim which
they have upon such relative.
34
While South Carolina's statutory provisions are similar to
those of England and other States which limit recovery to
pecuniary loss,35 the South Carolina case law has expanded the
elements of injury which are compensable. In Mishoe v. At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad Company,3s the South Carolina Su-
preme Court listed the following as general elements of dam-
age recoverable in a wrongful death action:
32. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 340, 105 N.W. 2d 118, 123 (1960).
33. S. C. CoDE ANN. §10-1954 (1962).
34. Petrie v. Columbia & G. R. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303, 320, 7 S. E. 515, 520
(1888) (emphasis added).
35. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11, 39 (1931); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 485, 493-94
(1950).
36. 186 S. C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938).
[Vol. 24
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(1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feel-
ings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship, and (6) depri-
vation of the use and comfort of the intestate's society, the loss of his
experience, knowledge, and judgment in managing the affairs of him-
self and of his beneficiaries, in addition to the loss of his ability to earn
money for the support, maintenance, care and protection of his wife
and children, and for the education and training of the latter.
3 7
Pecuniary loss is but one element of injury which can be re-
dressed and is not essential to the recovery of damages for the
other elements listed.8
Where pecuniary loss becomes compensable either by a
presumption or by actual proof of such loss, the controlling
considerations in valuing this element of damage have been
described as follows in Brooks v. United States: 39
Broadly stated, the controlling considerations in fixing "pecuniary loss"
are (1) the prospective earnings of the decedent subsequent to death,
(2) calculated on the basis of his "work expectancy", and (3) the ex-
tent to which his statutory beneficiaries "might logically and reasonably
have been expected to share in "such prospective earnings. . . . And
although, in the case of a widow and surviving children, there is a pre-
sumption of "pecuniary loss" . . . the actual determination of the "loss"
should be established through "facts and data" duly proven, sufficient to
furnish "a basis from which" the jury or Court "may approximate the
proper amount with reasonable certainty."
40
As stated in the quotation above, the court will presume
a pecuniary loss in certain wrongful death cases. But in ap-
plying the wrongful death statute to the death of a minor child
this presumption does not arise.41 The basis for the refusal to
presume a pecuniary loss is the rudimentary observation that
few children, if any, actually contribute substantial financial
support to any family:
Of course, it is presumed that the dependents of a family breadwinner
have suffered pecuniary loss because of his death, but the converse of
that proposition does not necessarily follow in this day after the aboli-
37. Id at 419, 197 S. E. at 104-105 (1938); See also Brooks v. U.S., 273
F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967).
38. Barksdale v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 76 S. C. 183, 56 S. E. 906,
908 (1907).
39. 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S. C. 1967).
40. Id. at 626.
41. Sec Patrick v. U. S., 316 F. 2d 9 (4th Cir. 1963); Gregg v. Coleman,
235 F. Supp. 237 (D. S. C. 1964) ; Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S. C. 127, 165 S.E. 2d
640 (1969); Mock v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. Co., 227 S. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 830
(1955).
19721 NOTES
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tion of a child labor and the substantial economic emanicpation of those
minors, approaching majority, who do work.42
How pecuniary loss can be proven in such an action is not
clear from South Carolina case law. It seems that if some sort
of pecuniary contribution to a family can be shown, recovery
for pecuniary loss would be proper. But such contribution
would probably have to be in the form of outside or extra-
family employment, and the sum so earned would probably
have to be fairly substantial. The Brooks test for evaluating
pecuniary loss is inapplicable since as a general rule in wrong-
ful death actions for minor children, damages are recoverable
only for the period of the child's minority and for such bene-
fits after minority as are probable and reasonably certain
from the evidence.43 Although there is no South Carolina case
directly on this point, it seems probable that this view would
be followed since the South Carolina statutory law is intended
to redress the relatives or heirs at law of the deceased for the
loss they suffered from the death.4 4 In the case of a child, re-
latives could normally expect to receive pecuniary aid, if any,
only during the child's minority.
If no pecuniary loss can be shown, the elements of dam-
ages are limited to "mental shock and suffering, wounded feel-
ings, grief and sorrow, loss of companionship and deprivation
of the use and comfort of intestate's society. . . .,5 In addi-
tion, the funeral costs are compensable in such an action.46
42. Patrick v. U. S., 316 F. 2d 9, 11 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. 25 A. C.J.S. Death §103(b) (1966). One case decided in Hawaii, in 1961
permitted recovery for the likely earnings of a four year old boy during his
life expectancy. This figure was to be diminished by the probable cost of his
owis maintenance and the provisions he would have made for his family and
dependents during his life. However, this award was made under the survival
statute of that State which had been interpreted to permit such a recovery by
parents of a child. See Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 369 P. 2d 96 (1961).
44. S. C. COD AxN. §10-1952 (1962).
45. Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S. C. 127, 165 S. E. 2d 640 (1969) ; Mock v.
Atlantic C.L.R.R. Co., 227 S. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 830 (1955); Gomillion v.
Forsythe, 218 S. C. 211, 65 S. E. 2d 297 (1950).
46. S. C. COD ANN. §10-209.1 (Supp. 1970). Apparently, even prior to the
enactment of this statuory provision, Petrie v. Columbia & G.R.R. Co., 29 S. C.
303, 7 S. E. 515 (1888) provided authority for the recovery of such costs.
In Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S. C. 211, 226, 62 S. E. 2d 297, 303 (1950), the
court stated,
[Vol. 24
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IT]here is considerable conflict among the authorities in other States
as to whether funeral expenses really constitute a proper element of dam-
ages in such a case. The law, however is settled in this State that where
such expenses are paid by the beneficiary they are a proper element of
damages. Petrie v. Columbia & G.R.R. Co.... It may also be mentioned
that ordinarily funeral expenses are not involved in a Lord Campbell's Act
case, being usually payable out of the estate of the decedent.
In allowing recovery for sentimental losses, South Caro-
lina has taken the minority view.47 Moreover, there is con-
siderable conflict of opinion between jurisdictions regarding
the recovery of damages for the loss of companionship.48 It
is apparent that, aside from the factor of presuming no pecun-
inary loss, South Carolina takes a liberal view toward the
compensable elements of damages in wrongful death actions
involving minor children. This does not mean that verdicts
rendered are necessarily higher, but it does allow the jury or
judge greater leeway in arriving at a dollar amount.
In evaluating the South Carolina approach to damages,
the judicial comments in reported cases provide the most use-
ful critiques. In the 1955 South Carolina case of Mock v. At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad Company,4 9 the father of a twelve
year old boy was awarded $50,000 actual damages and $15,000
punitive damages. The large amount of the verdict led to a
lengthy discussion by the court of the propriety of granting
this large sum. The majority felt that the court should over-
turn jury verdicts only in extraordinary situations:
The unquestioned power of this court... to strike down the judgment
of the lower court has been, and should continue to be exercised only in
those rare instances in which the amount of the verdict is so shock-
ingly excessive as manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by
passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. Proper application of this
power is always difficult, because . . . there is no fixed standard by
which the court may ascertain and characterize the excessiveness .... GO
The majority pointed to a case in which a four year old child's
parents were awarded $30,000 actual damages, which verdict
was not attacked on appeal.51 In refusing to grant a new trial,
47. Annot., 14 A.L.R_ 2d 485, 495-96 (1950). The only other States permit-
ting recovery for sentimental losses are Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, and West
Virginia.
48. Id. at 498-99.
49. 227 S. C. 245, 87 S. E. 830 (1955).
50. Id at 266, 87 S. E. 2d at 839.
51. Id. at 267, 87 S. E. 2d at 840, citing Hicklin v. Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 226
S. C. 484, 85 S. E. 2d 739 (1955).
1972] NOTES
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the court discussed the basic difficulty in determining exces-
siveness of verdicts in actions for the wrongful death of a
child:
It is inherently difficult [to determine excessiveness], where as in
the case at bar, there is no tangible factor of damage, such as earning
capacity, and the standard of recovery must be measured only by such
imponderables as mental anguish, grief and loss of companionship.5 2
The dissenting opinion in the Mock case, felt that the verdict
was grossly disproportionate to the injury and relied on two
legal annotations to support this view.5 3 Noting that the aver-
age vedict in similar cases tried in other jurisdictions was
$10,000 or less, and that no verdict of as much as $50,000
could be found in these annotations, the dissenting opinion be-
lieved that a clear abuse of discretion was evidenced by the
verdict.5
4
In a later case, Elliott v. Black River Electrical Co-op,55
involving the wrongful death of a farmer who was electrocuted
by the defendant's power lines, a verdict of $106,100 actual
damages and $5,000 punitive damages was returned. The
court again expressed its concern with such large awards:
The growing tendency in recent years toward verdicts in death cases,
which although not manifestly the result of passion, prejudice or other
improper motive, are nevertheless so large as to indicate, even in an in-
flated economy, undue liberality on the part of the jury, has given this
court much concern; but we have no power to reduce such verdicts.
If relief from them is to be provided, it must come from: (1) the juries
themselves, upon whose shoulders rests, primarily, responsibility for
them; (2) the trial judges in whom alone resides the discretionary
power to reduce such a verdict by ordering a new trial nisi; or (3)
the General Assembly, which alone has power to amend the present
statute by limiting recovery to pecuniary loss, by eliminating intangi-
ble and imponderable factors such as grief, etc., or by otherwise es-
tablishing a reasonably calculable measure of damages for wrongful
death.50
52. Mock v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. Co., 227 S. C. 245, 267, 87 S. E. 2d 830, 840
(1955) ; but see Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S. C. 127, 165 S. E. 2d 640 (1969) in
which an award of $250,000 actual damages for the death of a fifteen year old
girl was set aside.
53. Mock v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. Co., 227 S. C. 245, 262, 87 S. E. 2d 830, 837
(1955) citing Annot, 48 A.L.R. 837 (1927), and Annot, 14 A.L.R. 2d 550
(1950).
54. Id.
55. 233 S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
56. Id. at 265-66, 104 S. E. 2d at 374.
11
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The frustration evinced by these judicial remarks is due
partly to the inherent speculative nature of damages in all
wrongful death actions, but is also partly due to the liberal
damages standards in South Carolina which encourage even
greater speculation. Even in trials without juries, judges
themselves have difficulty in evaluating the amount of dam-
ages. One court noted that verdicts rendered under South Car-
olina law by a court without a jury ranged from "a low of
$6,500 for the death of a 3 year old boy to a high of $50,000
for the death of a 12 year old boy.57 This court resorted to
comparing the facts of the case at bar to a previously decided
case on the basis of the age of the decedent, the accident caus-
ing death, and the applicable law involved, and rendered a ver-
dict of exactly one half the size of the award in the earlier
case, reasoning that only one parent had suffered in the case
at the bar, while two had suffered in the earlier case.58 The
very least that can be said about such a method of determining
damages is that it is unusual.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparing South Carolina's method of measuring dam-
ages with the pecuniary loss, wage benefit-less-rearing costs
approach, the former is bogged down in a morass of intangible
elements which create a situation in which too much specula-
tion is permitted, while the latter is confined too greatly by an
unworkable, anachronistic formula. Wycko has been ac-
claimed by pecuniary loss jurisdictions as a harbinger of the
future method of measuring damages in children's wrongful
death actions.59 Wycko should not be an example for pecuni-
ary loss jurisdictions alone, but should also be a guide for
jurisdictions, like South Carolina, where the judiciary feels un-
able to curb excessive verdicts.
The Wycko "lost investment" test has the effect of facil-
itating larger verdicts in pecuniary loss jurisdictions, partially
because the jury does not have to deduct rearing costs and
partially because the element of loss of companionship is re-
dressable. In South Carolina, Wycko would create a tangible
57. Gregg v. Coleman, 235 F. Supp. 237, 241 (D. S. C. 1964).
58. Id. citing Patrick v. U. S., 316 F. 2d 9 (4th Cir. 1963).
59. Pavalon, Damages-Wrongful Death of Children, 50 Cm. B. Rxc. 84
(1968) ; Note, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death of Minor Children,
39 N. D. L. REv. 198 (1963).
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foundation from which the jury could work. This seems in-
finitely preferrable to permitting a jury to conjure up a figure
based on intangible elements of damages alone. It would also
provide the court with an economically understandable figure
against which awards for the intangible elements could be
measured to see if such awards were fairly proportionate to
the "lost investment" figure. It might be argued that this
would result in even larger verdicts than are presently being
awarded. To curb this possibility, the courts could combine
what are now considered three separate elements of dam-
ages - grief and sorrow, wounded feelings, and mental shock
and suffering - into one element of, for example, mental grief
and sorrow.60 The three elements are not realistically separate
and distinct. The same factual considerations proving each of
these elements usually overlap. Even if these elements were
not condensed into one, the courts would at least have what
they have been complaining is absent - a tangible foundation
for damages. Of course, in rare cases in which a wage benefit
from a child can be shown, such benefit should also be used in
determining pecuniary loss.
The propriety of classifying as a pecuniary loss a parent's
monetary expenditures in raising a child is not artificial or un-
reasonable. The amounts spent in the process of raising a
child are literally an investment by the parents toward a fu-
ture, as well as a present, return on this investment. Such a
return is not necessarily monetary since it may consist of only
a return of future companionship, care and attention for the
parents. In a family, this is a very real return from the rear-
ing of a child. Furthermore, the life of the child prior to death
is a composite of many of the elements set out in Wycko. For
example, his health is due to the proper feeding, clothing, and
medical attention provided for him by his family. The extent
to which he is capable of providing companionship is, at least
to some extent, dependent on his educational growth. It does
not seem that a court would be relying on very tenuous grounds
in classifying these losses as pecuniary. While it may be
argued that these are duties owed a child by law and should,
60. One Federal District Court Decision in South Carolina classified dam-
ages awarded in that case in a manner similar to that suggested. Brooks v.
U. S., 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S. C. 1967). In this case, awards were given for
(a) pecuniary loss, (b) loss of companionship and (c) for mental shock and
suffering.
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therefore, not be compensable, it must be realized that a
wrongful death action is not between a parent and child, but
between a third party and a parent or beneficiary and, there-
fore, the parent-child obligation is not involved. What is in-
volved is the third party's destruction of the parent-child re-
lationship.
Sanctioning the Wycko formula 'in South Carolina would
have benefits for both plaintiffs and defendants. The obvious
benefit to defendants is that this formula would tend to put a
jury on a more concrete foundation in determining damages
which would arguably permeate the deliberations in both the
tangible and intangible aspects. Plaintiffs are aided by the
fact that, even with an unsympathetic jury, a very real and
provable degree of damages can be persuasively demonstrated.
Further, this method would be beneficial in negotiating a set-
tlement figure.
As South Carolina cases have pointed out, the amounts of
wrongful death verdicts are increasing. A 1963 survey sum-
marized this trend to that point in time:
[T]he average death award for minors was $15,086 with a range of
$13,773 for children aged 12 or below and $16,562 for children aged 13
and above. A meticulous search of the reported and unreported cases
-during the last 5 years discloses . . .the modern trend to grant or af-
firm substantial reparation for the untimely death of minor children.6 1
It is foreseeable that the future problems in the minor child
wrongful death area will not be the awarding of insufficient
damages, but the awarding of excessive damages. The current
South Carolina standards for determining damages in such a
case can do nothing but stimulate this excessiveness. The 1969
case of Zorn v. Crawford6 2 reveals the failing of South Caro-
lina's present standard. In that case, a jury returned a verdict
$250,000 actual damages for the death of a fifteen year old girl
killed in an automobile accident. On appeal, a new trial was
ordered. The court stated that the evidence did not sustain
such a large verdict and stated that "[t]here must be some
semblance of a basis for justifying the verdict."63 Without
61. VALUATiON HAmOOK SEvica No. 33 (Oct. 1963) (Jury Verdict Re-
search, Cleveland, Ohio) cited in 32 Am. TIAI LAwYERs JouRNAL 633, 635
(1968).
62. Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S. C. 127, 165 S. E. 2d 640 (1969).
63. Id at 138, 165 S. E. 2d at 646 quoting Mock v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. Co.,
227 S. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 830 (1955).
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some boundaries, or principles by which damages can be as-
certained, at least some tint of "wergild" - or the paying for
the enormity of the offense - is still visibly present in the
awarding of damages for wrongful death.
J'AMES BOYCE PRESSLY, JR.
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